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Abstract
Purpose – Crises such as the Coronavirus pandemic pose extraordinary challenges to the decision making in
management teams. Teams need to integrate available information quickly to make informed decisions on the
spot and update their decisions as new information becomes available. Moreover, making good decisions is
hard as it requires sacrifices for the commongood, and finally, implementing the decisionsmade is not easy as it
requires persistence in the face of strong counterproductive social pressures.
Design/methodology/approach –We provide a “psychology of action” perspective on making team-based
management decisions in crisis by introducing collective implementation intentions (We-if-then plans) as a
theory-based intervention tool to improve decision processes. We discuss our program of research on forming
and acting on We-if-then plans in ad hoc teams facing challenging situations.
Findings – Teams with We-if-then plans consistently made more informed decisions when information was
socially or temporally distributed,when decisionmakers had tomake sacrifices for the common good, andwhen
strong social pressures opposed acting on their decisions. Preliminary experimental evidence indicates that
assigning simple We-if-then plans had similar positive effects as providing a leader to steer team processes.
Originality/value – Our analysis of self-regulated team decisions helps understand and improve how
management teams can make and act on good decisions in crises such as the Coronavirus pandemic.
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Acute crises such as the Coronavirus pandemic disrupt the way we normally do things and
fundamentally change the way we work (Rudolph et al., 2020). Responses to crises may
sometimes appear like a “one-person show”. For instance, Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern has
rightfully become associated with New Zealand’s fierce and effective response to the
pandemic. However, a careful analysis reveals that a key component of her leadership
behavior is that she made important decisions in expert teams (Wilson, 2020). Although
teams have a great potential to make good decisions, teams also exhibit decision biases
(Sunstein and Hastie, 2015); especially under time pressure, when the common good requires
accepting short-term individual losses, and when normative pressures arise. All these
handicaps are present during crises, calling for a model of team decisions in crisis.
In developing ourmodel, we follow recent recommendations to draw on behavioral science
for crafting an effective pandemic response (Van Bavel et al., 2020). We argue that crises
disrupt how teams naturally perform tasks andmagnifymaladaptive team processes. Teams
therefore need to plan the decision process prospectively, including when, where and how to
act. Our approach to management teams making decisions is akin to the approach of medical
teams performing a surgery. Medical teams usually do not cut a patient open and then start
looking for the tools to perform the necessary procedure. Instead, medical teams prepare all
necessary equipment beforehand, including equipment for emergency procedures. Such
preparation allows to respond swiftly (i.e. high speed) but also grants sufficient flexibility (i.e.
performing the right procedures for the situation at hand). We suggest that management
teams may psychologically prepare the mental tools necessary to make and enact good
decisions during crises by forming We-if-then plans.
We will proceed as follows: First, we develop a temporal model of team decisions,
including the three stages of deliberation, decision and implementation.We then analyze how
crises magnify existing and yield specific challenges for decision teams. Finally, we derive a
theory-based intervention to help master these challenges: We-if-then-planning (collective
implementation intentions, cIIs) and review our program of research on its effectiveness.
Team decisions: a “psychology of action” perspective
A fundamental assumption that many management scientists, practitioners and the general
public share is that highly motivated teams (i.e. those strongly committed) will ultimately
attain their goals. This is reflected in folkwisdom such as “if there is awill, there is away” and
also in management practices, such as providing financial incentives to increase the personal
value of organizational goals (Tosi et al., 2000). According to this perspective, challenges in
times of crisis demand even greater commitment, akin to a hero walking through fire to
accomplish the mission. There is some truth in this intuition, as those who lack commitment
will hardly ever attain their goals (Sheeran, 2002), and this especially holds true when the
going gets tough. However, a systematic analysis of the experimental evidence reveals that
even highly committed individuals frequently fail to attain their goals (Sheeran and Webb,
2016), and this is also the case for teams (Wieber et al., 2012). A high goal commitment is thus a
necessary but no sufficient condition for team goal attainment.
Accordingly, the psychology of action (Gollwitzer and Bargh, 1996; Gollwitzer and
Moskowitz, 1996) assumes that committing strongly to one’s goals (goal setting) is only the first
step toward goal attainment. One also has to implement goal-directed actions—a process
referred to as goal striving (Lewin et al., 1944; Lewin, 1926; Heckhausen and Gollwitzer, 1987).
During goal striving, several challenges may arise for the individual (see Gollwitzer and
Sheeran, 2006, for a detailed analysis of these challenges). Asmanagement teams are composed
of many individuals, these challenges may very well also affect conjoint goal attainment
(Wieber et al., 2012). Despite these parallels between individuals and teams, the specific
challenges for decision teams during crises likely differ. Decision teams first deliberate the




and finally persistent in implementing their decision (persist, Figure 1). We argue that crises
elicit a host of extraordinary challenges that all are particularly detrimental to action control at
the team level, hindering teams in making and implementing good decisions (Table 1).
Team decisions in times of crisis
Management teams have to make difficult decisions (Hambrick, 1987, 2015; Tindale and
Jeremy, 2020), and teamdecisions are highly susceptible to the impact of crises. This is because
crises render natural group functioning maladaptive and traditionally prescribed remedies
ineffective. Teams need to communicate effectively and coordinate their actions (Marks et al.,
2001). During business-as-usual, teams are highly effective in performing these behaviors
because established routines swiftly guide them (Pentland et al., 2012). Crises disrupt these
routines since they fundamentally change the ways in which we work together (Mayo, 2020),
thereby posing new challenges. With regard to decision teams, three challenges stand out:
deliberating efficiently, deciding for the common good and persisting to implement decisions.
Deliberating efficiently in times of crisis
Crises entail a host of emerging and rapidly changing information. A common approach in such
situations is to wait until all pertinent information is available, deliberate thoroughly and then
make a well-informed decision. Such an approach is not possible during crises where decisions
need to be made urgently (Kerrissey and Edmondson, 2020). The Coronavirus pandemic, for
instance, lead to high fluctuations of the oil price, temporary factory closures and a wide
application of home office.While such events showa certain coherence in hindsight, recognizing
or even predicting them at the time they occur is difficult. This is because the vast body of
pertinent information emerges from many different sources and over time as crises progress.
Making management decisions in teams in such critical times has the potential advantage
that each team member can bring unique expertise to the table, such as economic, medical or
epidemiological information. From an information processing point of view, such team
decisions may yield a benefit over individual decisions as (1) members actually may learn
from each other (i.e. contribute initially unshared information to the discussion) and (2) they
may integrate all available information to reach a different (and better) decision than each
individual alone (Schulz-Hardt and Mojzisch, 2012). Because individual members on their
own lack the information to identify the optimal decision in these situations, such situations
are commonly referred to as hidden profiles (Stasser et al., 1989). Regrettably, teams routinely
disregard unshared information—even if they jointly discuss it (Gigone and Hastie, 1993,
1997; Mojzisch et al., 2010; Mojzisch and Schulz-Hardt, 2010) —and instead rely on what
everybody already knows (i.e. shared information; Tindale and Kameda, 2000; Tindale and
Sheffey, 2002). Teams thus make suboptimal decisions in hidden profile situations. These
problems only intensifywhen teams face awealth of information or have to decide under time
Deliberate
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pressure (Stasser and Titus, 1987; Bowman and Wittenbaum, 2012; Lu et al., 2012; Mesmer-
Magnus et al., 2011). Both of these challenges are common during crises.
To improve decisions in hidden profile situations, teams usually need to take their time to
bring up and integrate available information. For instance, arguing for different decision
alternatives (advocacy procedure) improved team information processing, at least in terms of
increasing discussion intensity (Greitemeyer et al., 2006; Brian et al., 2013). Similarly, actual
dissent (which may be difficult to elicit in real teams) improved hidden profile decisions by
increasing discussion intensity in terms of discussion time and information elaboration
(Schulz-Hardt et al., 2006). Teams during crises, however, do not have the time for such
extended procedures, calling for a different approach.
Making urgent decisions in times of crisis moreover implies that the situation at hand is
evolving. Management teams therefore need to systematically revise initial decisions as new
information becomes available over time. For instance, during high replication rates of the
Coronavirus, factory closures were crucial; as soon as the pandemic was at least somewhat
under control, it became necessary to open up facilities. Even management teams that share
and integrate all information at a given point in timemay thus have to revise their decisions in
the light of emerging information. Research indicates that teams commonly fail to heed
emerging information and stick to their initial decision (i.e. escalate their commitment;
Sleesman et al., 2017). One may argue that such escalation would predominantly affect
inconsequential decisions. However, even medical teams were found to stick to a patient’s
treatment that turned out to be ineffective (Turpin et al., 2019).
One of the many processes leading to escalation of commitment (Sleesman et al., 2017) is
self-justification (Staw, 1981). Accordingly, escalation of commitment alleviates the
dissonance associated with admitting that an initial decision was a mistake. In line with
this perspective (1) being personally responsible for the initial decision, (2) having previously
expended resources (i.e. sunk cost, time invested) and (3) feeling personally threatened by the
negative feedback (i.e. ego threat) all increase the escalation of commitment. In teams, these
processes are particularly pronounced when each group member takes responsibility for a
joint decision, leading to greater escalation than in individuals (Sleesman et al., 2017). Times
of crisis pose all of these challenges, and thereforemanagement teams in times of crisis should
be particularly vulnerable to escalation of commitment.
To improve decisions in escalation of commitment situations, one may change the team






















cII “And if our
muscles hurt, then


















to stay on track
despite
discomfort






However, introducing further volatility by changing staff is hardly advisable during crises.
And, as noted above, teams may simply lack the time for extended debates with role-play (i.e.
artificial dissent) during quickly evolving crises, calling for a different approach.
Deciding for the common good in times of crisis
Even when mastering the challenge of considering all pertinent information, good decisions
during crises are often hard to make. This is because scarce resources and adaptation
pressures preclude continuing with business-as-usual. Good decisions in times of crisis are
thus often tough decisions to make since they require putting the common good over
immediate self-interests (Kerr, 1983, 2013; Van Lange et al., 2013; Bridoux and Stoelhorst,
2020). When decisions pose such an explicit conflict between collective and individual
outcomes (Dawes, 1980; Messick and Brewer, 2005; Weber et al., 2004), deciding in favor of
one’s group (i.e. cooperating) requires self-control (Sheldon and Fishbach, 2011; Martinsson
et al., 2012). Indeed, even those committed to the collective goal of securing common, long-
term benefits often decide selfishly (Komorita and Parks, 1995) and shy away from
uncomfortable or costly decisions, thus giving up on their own goals (Klinger, 1975). When
making such decisions as a team, it becomes even harder to focus on the common good
(Wildschut et al., 2003). Apparently, being part of a team makes it easier to justify greedy
decisions and instills a greater fear of being exploited (Wildschut and Insko, 2007).
Such short-sighted decision making against the common good was, for example, reflected
in some universities’ requirement for students to return to campus during the Coronavirus
pandemic (Marris, 2020). In British universities, students in lock-down apparently were not
allowed to leave their dormitories, were lacking basic services such as laundromats and even
had to care for their infected class-mates (Mueller, 2020). This accelerated the spread of the
disease. One reason for calling students back to campus was the revenue they bring in, which
many universities depend on. As one student put it: “Students are money in the bank, and as
long as we’re on campus they’ll worry about the consequences later. (. . .) The financial side
has taken priority over student well-being and the greater good” (Mueller, 2020).
A few interventions have shown to help teams focus on the common good. For instance,
introducing interdependencies across multiple decisions makes cooperation rewarding,
thereby increasing team decisions for the common good (Kugler et al., 2012). Moreover, when
the situation affords the option to withdraw, groups frequently back out instead of deciding
against the common good (Insko et al., 2005). During crises, however, entire industries
collapse and it therefore is uncertain whether repeated interactions will be possible at all.
Moreover, management teams seldom have the option to simply back out during crises,
calling for a different approach.
Persisting in times of crisis
As crises play out, the implementation of good decisions requires persistence despite
discomfort and rising social pressures on decision makers. Teamwork commonly supports
persistence but it is also susceptible to normative influences. It is therefore likely that teams
give up on their decisions once social pressures arise.
Teams are known to be highly susceptible to normative pressures especially when these
come from within. Given that crises demand tough decisions, it is likely that many members
of one’s organization will be affected. In such situations, peers may come to “call in favors”
and demand that management teams change their decisions. In fact, teams may be
particularly likely to justify unethical decisions such as breaking a signed agreement (Sarah
et al., 2009). For instance, a management team may be determined to restructure one’s
department but give up on it once observing other managers not following through.
To shield team members against strong social pressures, traditional approaches assume




However, setting goals was found to be ineffective in reducing compliance with inappropriate
requests from people one had a strong connection to (Wieber et al., 2014, Study 2; Gollwitzer
et al., 2011, Study 2). Merely setting strong goals is thus unlikely to successfully counteract
the strong social pressures that arise during times of crisis, calling for a different approach.
Teamwork is highlymotivating when eachmember’s contributions are clearly visible and
crucial for team success (Kerr and Hertel, 2011). Accordingly, interacting groups perform
better than non-interacting individuals in physical persistence tasks where effort is clearly
related to performance (K€ohler, 1926; Witte, 1989; see Kerr and Hertel, 2011, for review); this
effect holds true in real-world action teams (H€uffmeier et al., 2017). Based on this research, one
would expect that teams are well equipped to persistently endure the implementation of their
decision, even during crises. However, our Psychology of Action perspective suggests that
high motivation still leaves substantial team potential untapped, calling for alternative
interventions.
Mastering times of crisis: We-if-then plans promote good decisions
Decision teams’ natural behavior is maladaptive and traditional interventions are ineffective
in times of crisis, calling for applicable alternative interventions. We argue that teams may
resort to collective plans to better master the challenges of making and enacting good
decisions in times of crisis. Groups seldom engage in spontaneous planning (Hackman et al.,
1976) and “the processes that underlie successful planning in teams are not well understood”
(DeChurch and Haas, 2008). Pointing to the potential of planning, groups in one study only
capitalized onmember expertise when they had planned collaboratively (Woolley et al., 2008).
Our point of departure for analyzing the importance of planning in management teams
during crises is a large body of individual-level research indicating that forming if-then plans
or implementation intentions (IIs; Gollwitzer, 1993, 1999, 2018) helps committed individuals
attain their goals (meta-analyses by Gollwitzer and Sheeran, 2006; Adriaanse et al., 2011;
Belanger-Gravel et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2015; Toli et al., 2016; Vila et al., 2017; Silva et al., 2018;
McWilliams et al., 2019; and Webb et al., 2012; meta-analysis of meta-analyses by Keller
et al., 2020).
Regarding management teams, the question arises how such social entities can plan
ahead. Onemay simply prescribe individual plans to each teammember to regulate their own
behavior. However, as outlined above, management teams face specific challenges during
crises, casting doubt on the potential success of such an approach. Assuming that most
management decisions are made by teams (Hambrick, 1987) and that making a good decision
may be represented as a collective goal (Wieber et al., 2012), collective planning may the best
approach to improve respective team behaviors (Th€urmer et al., 2015a).
Group members can pursue collective goals (e.g. Weldon and Weingart, 1993; Kramer
et al., 2013), and, when it comes to setting goals, the simple distinction between We and I can
make a big difference (Mitchell and Silver, 1990; Kleingeld et al., 2011). While We-goals
promote cooperative behaviors, I-goals promote the use of competitive strategies (van Mierlo
and Kleingeld, 2010). We therefore argued that teams can form “We-plans” or collective
implementation intentions (cIIs; e.g. “And if we encounter situation S, then we will show
response R!”; Th€urmer et al., 2015a) to specify when, where and how the group wants to act
toward a set goal. Referring to the group in a We-if-then plan should increase focus on the
group and should thereby help teams and groups to strive for their goals more effectively by
promoting the key group processes of collaboration and cooperation (cf. Mayo, 2020).
Tailoring if-then plans to teams should be highly promising during crises for at least three
reasons. First, making if-then plans is easy and efficient (the interventions used in the studies
reported below took about 5 min). Even when there is little time, teams in crisis situations can






helps detecting an anticipated critical situation swiftly, thereby ensuring that it is not
overlooked (Parks-Stamm et al., 2007). Such efficient action control should optimize decision
processes under the time constraints of a crisis. Third, if-then planning may even lead to a
more automated responding by creating a strong situation-response link (McCrea et al., 2014).
Such responses should help prioritize what really counts and withstand strong peer
pressures, even when limited cognitive resources are available during crises.
In the following, we will report research testing the hypothesis that We-if-then planning
(i.e. forming collective implementation intentions) helps teams make better decisions. As the
effects of if-then plans are found to be strongest for difficult goals (Gollwitzer and Sheeran,
2006; Gollwitzer, 2014), we tested cIIs under tough conditions (e.g. time pressure, financial
incentives or strong peer pressure) that are present during crises. We specifically highlight
features of our studies that make them pertinent to conditions during the Coronavirus
pandemic.
Planning to deliberate
We investigated whether if-then plans can help teams integrate a host of information that is
socially distributed between members or temporally distributed as it only emerges over time.
Regarding socially distributed information, we (Th€urmer et al., 2015b) reasoned that if-then
planning may help teams integrate the available information at the right time, even when
time pressure calls for making a decision quickly. If-then plans help individuals break
routines (Aarts et al., 1999) and deliberate about their decisions carefully (Henderson et al.,
2007; Doerflinger et al., 2017). Since cIIs refer to the team, they should promote considering
crucial new information (i.e. information initially uniquely held by one member) during
discussions and improve decisions.
Teams of three students made four consecutive decisions in a laboratory setting (i.e.
choosing an apartment, appointing a professor, selecting a shop location and hiring the best
applicant for a company position). Akin to teamdecisions during crises, these group decisions
had real-world consequences as students received a monetary bonus for each correct
decision, each decision task contained a wealth of new information (45 information items),
and teams had to decide under time pressure (6 min maximum). Before working on the
decisions, teams took about 5 min to form a cII or a respective control plan. Teams randomly
assigned to the cII condition specified a critical situation (coming to the point of making a
decision) and a helpful strategy (reviewing all available information), and linked the two in an
if-then format: “And when we finally take the decision sheet to note our preferred alternative,
then we will go over the advantages of the non-preferred alternatives again.” Teams in the
control condition specified the same strategy but without using an if-then link: “We will go
over the advantages of the non-preferred alternatives again”.
Teams then worked on the first three decisions that represented so-called hidden profiles.
Team members received individual information implying a suboptimal decision alternative,
collectively discussed the decision and finally made a joint decision by marking their
preferred option on a decision sheet. After completing the third hidden profile task, teams
worked on a fourth decision task. Unbeknownst to them, unbiased information was available
to each member from the onset. This way, we sought to test if our planning intervention
would backfire (e.g. make teams change their optimal initial preference blindly). We recorded
and coded the team discussions (Th€urmer et al., 2018).
In line with our assertion that integrating socially distributed information in hidden
profiles poses substantial challenges, the majority of teams did not select the optimal
alternative (only 6% correct decisions). However, while none of the teams in the control
condition solved any of the hidden profile problems correctly (0% cases solved), teams in the




cIIs indeed recapitulated more crucial, previously unshared information. Importantly, all
teamsmade very good decisions in the fourth case where key information was available from
the onset (control condition: 93% correct; cII condition: 100% correct). This indicates that
planning did not make teams change their preferences blindly but to thoroughly deliberate
available information. Collective planning with cIIs thus lead to better team decisions under
time pressure when a wealth of information was socially distributed between teammembers,
indicating that We-if-then plans help make informed decisions on the spot. During crises, it
may moreover be tempting to follow one’s gut-instincts and change decisions blindly.
Importantly, cIIs did not lead to such random variations but to well-justified decisions under
time pressure, as indicated by high solution rates when teammembers’ initial preference was
correct (i.e. in Case 4).
Crises are evolving situations and a decision that was once prudent may later turn out to
be suboptimal. Thus, even a team that shares and integrates all information at a given point
in time may have to revise this decision as new information becomes available. As crises
prohibit frequently changing the composition of decision teams, we tested whether collective
if-then planning helps teams psychologically detach from their earlier investments and heed
temporally distributed information. We reasoned that teams may find it difficult to
deliberately distance themselves from their initial decision (i.e. by only forming respective
goals). As if-then planning can be used to promote deep reasoning (Doerflinger et al., 2017;
Martiny-Huenger et al., 2011), we argued that teams can resort to collective plans to facilitate
taking an onlooker’s perspective.
To test this assumption, we conducted two experimental studies with interactive teams of
three students (Wieber et al., 2015a). Teams assumed the role of a city council committee
steering a social investment project of building a new kindergarten (Haslam et al., 2006; see
also Dietz-Uhler, 1996). Similar to crises, the project was described as urgent and unforeseen
events elicited substantial threats (e.g. health hazards to children). For this task, all teams in
Study 1 formed the goal “We want to make the optimal investment decision in each phase!”
and, depending on random assignment, added the cII “If we are about to make an investment
decision, then we will judge the project as neutral observers who are not responsible for
earlier decisions!” or a self-distancing goal intention “Wewant to judge the project as neutral
observers who are not responsible for earlier investment decisions!” (control condition). In
three consecutive phases, teams then received information on the actual state of the project,
discussed it and made a unanimous investment decision.
While initial information was entirely positive, later information was first mixed and then
mostly negative, calling for reducing the investments over time. Team investment decisions
served as the dependent measure. To disentangle the effects of goals and plans, teams in
Study 2were randomly assigned to form (1) no goal or plan, (2) only the goal intention tomake
optimal investment decisions or (3) this goal intention plus the cII to take an onlookers
perspective (goal and cII were identical to those used in Study 1). Moreover, we made it clear
that funds not invested in the current project would be available to other important projects,
thus making it easier for teams to justify lower investments. Only teams that had added cIIs
to their goal to make optimal investment decisions reduced their high levels of investment
(Study 1) or maintained their moderate levels of investment (Study 2) in response to the
emerging information. Those teams that had only formed goal intentions escalated even
when they had added self-distancing goal intentions (Study 1), and they escalated as much as
control teams without such a goal (Study 2).
In sum, our research findings indicate that We-if-then plans (cIIs) help both integrate
socially distributed information when making initial decisions and consider conflicting
temporally distributed information when revising past decisions (Wieber et al., 2015a;
Th€urmer et al., 2015b). For management during crises, the question arises how cIIs fare in






experiment (G€orke et al., 2020) provides preliminary evidence in this regard. Teams of four
students worked on the decision tasks with socially distributed information used in our
previous research, again forming either cIIs or mere goals. Moreover, one of the team
members was actually a trained confederate who either served as a transactional leader (i.e.
reminding team members of the task goals and the promised rewards) or merely as a note-
taker. We again imposed a strict time limit and confronted teams with a wealth of
information. Both cIIs and a leader improved the quality of team decisions, with no
discernible difference between these interventions. Given that our cII intervention only took
about 5 min and leaders commonly spend a substantial amount of time with their teams (and
often receive a substantial salary), using cIIs to promote better decision making in teams
seems to be the more time and cost-effective strategy.
Planning to decide
A second challenge for managing crises is that good decisions often entail personal sacrifice.
This, for instance, is the case when wages and bonuses are cut or employees need to accept
poor working conditions. Teams are particularly likely to abandon long-term collective goals
and make selfish decisions, especially when resources become scarce and one-shot
interactions prohibit continued cooperation. These conditions are present during crises,
calling for interventions to help management teams focus on the common good. In
individuals, if-then planning can help prioritize goals (Kirk et al., 2011; Stroebe et al., 2013) and
promote actions at a personal cost (e.g. Hall et al., 2012; Tr€otschel and Gollwitzer, 2007;
Nickerson and Rogers, 2010). Accordingly, including the collective “we” in a plan should help
focus teams on collective outcomes, facilitating tough decision making in the service of the
common good.
To answer these questions, we (Th€urmer et al., 2020b) used a business scenario task.
Similar to the conditions during crises, we introduced actual stakes (i.e. paid participants
according to their decisions), substantial volatility (i.e. each decision was made with another
opponent; one-shot decisions) and complete uncertainty (i.e. outcome feedback was provided
after the experiment). The task posed a dilemma between a collectively profitable choice that
was individually unprofitable (cooperation) and an individually profitable choice that was
collectively unprofitable (defection). Importantly, participants’ own business belonged to an
alliance group that could earn a collective pay-off that would be equally divided between the
two players. In fact, these collective pay-off matrices were constructed so that the pay-offs
were identical to the individual matrices. Before working on the task, participants received a
“decision training” that either contained the cII “When we are about to make our pricing
decision, then we will consider the collective pay-off,” the II “When I am about to make my
pricing decision, then I will consider my own pay-off” or a neutral control plan, neither
referring to the group nor the individual: “When the decision screen appears, then a decision
has to be made.” Participants then played eight rounds of the business task with other
alliance group members and eight rounds of the business scenario task against strangers.
In comparison to the II and control conditions, participants with the cII to consider the
group pay-off indeed cooperatedmorewith other alliance groupmembers. This demonstrates
that cIIs can promote tough decisions in the service of the group. Participants were paid
according to their decisions, and cIIs thus helped participants forego some of their own
payment to support the common good. Our results moreover indicate that this cooperation
was strategic and only in the service of one’s own group.When playing against strangers and
in a structurally similar investment game that they had not planned for, no difference
between conditions emerged.
Our findings are informative for team decisions in times of crisis, when decision-makers




sacrifices only promotes collective success if all decision-makers cooperate. It is therefore
important to cooperate with one’s group in the situation planned for to deter free-riders
(Lewin, 1939/1997). Strategic planning with cIIs induced exactly this kind of context-specific
cooperation in our experiment. On the other hand, one may argue that individual self-interest
spurs collective success (Maciejovsky and Budescu, 2013; Liu et al., 2019), indicating that it
would be best to only apply individual plans. However, such market effects require strong
reciprocity, which may be difficult to induce during crises. Collective planning thus seems
well suited to promote team decisions for the common good.
Planning to persist
During times of crisis, good decisions are not the end goal but the start of a long
implementation process. This is because crises such as the Coronavirus pandemic play out
over time and therefore require persistence. During this process, it is likely that stakeholders
start to question decisions that are uncomfortable for them, leading to rising social pressures
on management teams to give up on their decisions.
It is very difficult for management teams to persist in the face of such imminent social
pressures, and the mere conviction that tough decisions are necessary will thus not be
sufficient to get these decisions implemented. Individuals who form if-then plans create
strong situation-response links (Wieber and Sassenberg, 2006; Martiny-Huenger et al., 2017)
that trigger the specified goal-directed response (then-part) within milliseconds after
encountering the critical situation specified in the if-part (Wieber et al., 2015b). In a sense, if-
then plans allow to strategically delegate action control to a situational cue (Gollwitzer,
2014). We consequently argue that forming collective if-then plans (cIIs) should help teams
stick to the enactment of their decision, even when strong antagonistic social
pressures arise.
We tested this prediction in the context of impulse buying decisions (Th€urmer et al., 2020a,
Study 1). To elicit strong social influence, we primed a group membership that commonly
pressures their members into impulse buying (peer group). As a control condition, we
reminded participants of a group that does not create such pressures (fellow student group).
Qualitative and quantitative pretesting within the target population of undergraduates
showed that peers do indeed support impulse buying (see also Luo, 2005), whereas fellow
students promote being frugal. In the second part of our experiment, participants first formed
a cII constituting a useful strategy in an if-then plan (“And if we want to put something in our
shopping basket, then we will only take what we really need!”). To determine whether the if-
then format also contributes to cII effects, participants in two control conditions either
learned the same strategy but not in an if-then format (“We will only take into our shopping
basket what we really need!”) or received if-then instructions containing all of the relevant
words but without constituting a helpful strategy (“And if we want something that we really
need, then we will put it in our basket!”).
Participants then performed a hypothetical shopping task to prepare a certain dish for
their respective group. Participants who had formed cIIs indeed made fewer impulse
purchases (i.e. selected fewer items unrelated to the planned dish), with and without social
pressure. Moreover, the if-then format further reduced impulse purchases, indicating that a
strengthened associative if-then link qualifies as a psychological process underlying cII
effects.
We used low-stakes decisions among highly capable undergraduates. It may therefore
have been relatively easy to withstand social pressures. To rule out this alternative
explanation, we conducted a large-scale correlational study with adolescents, who are
especially susceptible to social pressures (Oettingen and Gollwitzer, 2015). Participants read






questions about themselves and impulse buying. Participants’ reported automatic and
deliberate peer pressure (i.e. automaticity of shopping with peers and peer norms) emerged as
strong predictors of impulse buying decisions in the control condition. This relation was
significantly weaker in the if-then planning condition (i.e. these predictors interacted with the
planning condition). If-then planning thus helped decision-makers to withstand social
pressures, even when being highly vulnerable. This indicates that cIIs may even be effective
when social pressures are extremely strong, such as during crises.
With regard to management decisions in crisis, the apparent effectiveness of cIIs in
combating automatic social pressures is important. Automatic social pressures often go
unnoticed, especially when decisions are made urgently during crises, and therefore easily
derail even well-intentioned decision-makers. It might therefore not be sufficient to merely
convince management teams to stay on target (i.e. increase goal commitment); to stay on
track, one should additionally encourage management teams to prospectively plan how to
make and implement their decisions, ideally in an if-then format.
Even when keeping social pressures in check, persistently implementing decisions during
crises is uncomfortable, for instance when facing the daily hassle of wearing a face-mask.
Interdependent teams are well-equipped to inspire motivation to persist in the face of such
discomfort. But our action perspective suggests that even highly motivated teams may not
reach their full potential. We therefore tested whether cIIs would provide an added benefit
and increase physical persistence in a well-established task (Th€urmer et al., 2017). Teams of
three students jointly lifted a medicine ball (adapted from Bray, 2004). Team success thus
depended on all members, posing a collective incentive (indispensability), and individual
performance was visible, posing an individual incentive (identifiability; Kerr and Hertel,
2011).Much like common recommendations during crises (e.g. wearing facemasks), holding a
weight is not dangerous but it is uncomfortable (e.g. induces muscle pain) and leads to self-
doubts (e.g. exaggerated feelings of exhaustion), thereby tempting performers to give up
prematurely. If-then planning can help ignore such detrimental states (Schweiger Gallo et al.,
2009) and promote encouraging inner speech (Th€urmer et al., 2013). We consequently
expected that the cII “And if our muscles hurt, then we will ignore the pain and tell ourselves:
We can do it!” as well as the II “And if my muscles hurt, then I will ignore the pain and tell
myself: I can do it!” should increase team persistence. However, assuming that cIIs lead to a
team focus, we expected to see differences in how teammembers would interact. Teams in the
control groups received the same strategies suggested in either an individual or a collective
goal format (i.e. “We [I] will ignore our [my] muscle pain and tell ourselves [myself]: We [I] can
do it!” [individual phrasing in brackets]).
In line with our hypotheses, teams with the II and the cII improved their performance in
comparison to the respective control group (mere goal strategy). Importantly, cIIs intensified
team-focused communication in comparison to IIs, as indicated by the number of words
spoken and references made to the team during task performance. Teams with IIs referred
more to themselves (first person singular pronouns used). Both IIs and cIIs can thus support
persistence in the service of the team but while IIs support individual goal striving (e.g. little
and self-centered social interaction), cIIs support collective goal striving (e.g. more and team-
centered interaction). We confirmed the causal impact of these team processes in a
subsequent interactive small-group experiment by manipulating communication. Teams
with the cII indeed performed better when encouraged to communicate but teams with the II
performed better when communication was prevented.
Key to team decisions during crises, teams with cIIs took the initiative to communicate
about their team. Sticking to oneself may be an effective strategy during simple physical
tasks but is certainly not effective for interactive intellectual tasks, such as making
management decisions. In times of crisis, the usual communication channels are blocked (e.g.




requires the initiative of all team members (Mayo, 2020). Our research suggests that cIIs can
help team members take this initiative.
General discussion
Times of crisis demand informed management decisions focused on the common good and
untainted by undue social pressures. Our analysis indicates that even highly committed
teamswill often fail atmaking such good decisions in times of crisis. Fortunately, our analysis
also indicates that simple We-if-then plans can contribute much to mastering this challenge.
Our empirical evidence shows that teams with cIIs are more likely to (1) fully deliberate on
socially or temporally distributed information, (2) decide for the common good at a personal
cost and (3) persist to implement their decisions in the face of undue social pressures and
discomfort. These conclusions are based on experimental evidence, providing support for the
causal impact of collective plans and a host of experiments with interactive teams, providing
support for the applicability of We-if-then plans in management teams.
Translational impact and application
Three key empirical questions regarding cIIs in management teams in crisis remain open: (1)
Will cIIs work in management settings? (2) Will the benefits of cIIs outweigh their costs and
potential risks? (3) And how can management teams form cIIs that apply to their specific
situation? We have not investigated any of these questions directly but will now attempt to
provide answers based on related existing research.
Implementation intention effects have been observed in a broad range of applied settings,
including health behavior (Adriaanse et al., 2011; Belanger-Gravel et al., 2013; Vila et al., 2017)
and entrepreneurial decisions (van Gelderen et al., 2017; Adam and Fayolle, 2015). Moreover,
in most of our studies, we observed actual behavior that had consequences to participants’
everyday life. Observing actual behavior is key to ensure the generalization from the
laboratory to the field (Baumeister et al., 2010), and this is especially true for observing
behavior in interacting groups (Moreland et al., 2010). Our present lab results therefore have a
good chance of ultimately showing a translational impact.
The second question concerns the benefits, costs and potential risks of forming cIIs. One
may argue that the effects of behavioral interventions are “too small to worry about” in
management settings. However, a recent meta-analysis of meta-analyses found that if-then
planning had an average effect of d 5 0.54 (Keller et al., 2020). This medium effect is
comparable to the relation between firm performance and CEO pay (Tosi et al., 2000) and to
assigning a leader (G€orke et al., 2020). Importantly, the up-front costs of forming cIIs are
small. Participants in our laboratory studies took about five minutes on average to form the
required goals and plans, using simple pencil and papermethodologies. Evenwhen assuming
that an intervention in a field setting may require more explanation upfront, only minimal
time-investment is needed. Concerning the risks, one may fear that if-then planning leads to
rigidly following a chosen course of action. This could prove detrimental in times of crisis
when the situation at hand changes rapidly. Our research, however, indicates that teamswith
cIIs adjusted their behavior quite flexibly: Teamswith cIIs strategically cooperated only with
group members and in the situation planned for, and cIIs even helped revise decisions in the
light of new information. This indicates that cIIs do not lead to rigidly following a set course
of action.
Finally, the time needed for traditional management training formats may be lacking in
times of crisis. But translating our basic research findings on if-then planning directly into
large-scale interventions is no easy endeavor either (Cohen and Sherman, 2014), as one needs






be to administer planning in questionnaires at a large scale, much like we did in most of the
studies discussed in the present paper. Taking a different approach, people could develop
plans tailored to their current situations and goals. To achieve this, teams could engage in
mental contrasting with implementation intentions (MCII; reviews by Oettingen et al., 2013;
Oettingen, 2014). Mentally contrasting a desired future with present obstacles helps identify
critical situations and goal-directed behaviors (Oettingen and Mayer, 2002), which then can
be linked using an if (critical situation) – then (goal-directed behavior) statement. Several
intervention studies in field settings observed positive MCII effects on behavior change (e.g.
Valshtein et al., 2020; Mutter et al., 2020; Loy et al., 2016). Gagne (2018) suggests that strategic
planning in organizations should incorporate the principles of if-then planning by using cIIs.
As the present research indicates, We-if-then planning can help teams deliberate, decide and
persist tomeet challenges during crises and such large-scale interventions are therefore likely
to be highly successful.
Theoretical implications
On a theoretical level, our model advances the understanding of management teams during
crises in at least three ways. First, our account shows how individual team members can
employ their self-regulatory capabilities in the service of the team. Onemay argue that such
effects can be explained parallel to the individual level (e.g. merely by taking into account
team members’ social identification). Our model goes beyond that and assumes that
collective planning focuses team interactions on the team outcomes. In line with this
assumption, cIIs elicited cooperation specific to one’s team and team-focused interaction
(Th€urmer et al., 2017; Th€urmer et al., 2020b). In contrast, assigning individual plans to each
member of a team did not elicit such collective behavior. Second, according to recent
theorizing, there may be an optimal level of uncertainty for team functioning (Griffin and
Grote, 2020). Planning may enable teams to shape their environment to attain such optimal
levels of uncertainty. And finally, our account highlights how teams can adaptively
regulate their behavior in the face of crises. Such behavior has much in common with a
characteristic referred to as resilience. As Stoverink et al. (2018) note, “[r]esilient teams need
resources to identify adverse events with speed and accuracy to keep small problems from
becoming major obstacles.” Our theorizing would suggest that collective if-then plans are
well-suited to serve this demand since they are not only effective but also efficient; they
need few resource to detect critical situations and elicit the necessary responses quickly and
reliably.
Future research
Our research highlights three important areas for future research.Most prominently, we have
so far tested our model with interacting teams in laboratory experiments. This approach
provides the gold-standard of causal evidence: Collective planning indeed improved
performance! It is, however, mute to whether our model holds in field settings. Individual-
level research on if-then planning in extreme situations (van Gelderen et al., 2017) and in
organizational health interventions (Lehmann et al., 2019) suggests that this should be the
case. Due to the different processes at play with collective planning, future research on this
question is still needed however (e.g. Lehmann et al., 2019).
We moreover observed a discontinuity between collective and individual plans, such that
only collective plans promoted coordinative and cooperative behaviors (Th€urmer et al., 2017)
that are key for teams managing crises (Mayo, 2020). Individual-level and team-level
characteristics such as problem-solving orientation (Kerrissey et al., 2020) or expertise of the
group members (Mayo et al., 2019) may help teams show these behaviors, even when they do




Finally, our model so far is mute to the organizational level. In this regard, Gagne (2018)
suggests that strategic planning should be carried out according to the principles of if-then
planning and Grant Halvorson (2014) argues that leaders may use implementation intentions
to guide their teams. An exciting program of research on so-called collaborative
implementation intentions observed that involving a partner in if-then planning can
promote goal attainment in the health domain (e.g. exercise; Prestwich et al., 2012; or breast
self-examination; Prestwich et al., 2005). Our model suggests that such approaches could
effectively prepare organizations and their teams for emerging crises, much like medical
teams at the operating table.
Conclusion and outlook
In the current paper, we made the attempt to integrate two of the major areas of research
fathered by Kurt Lewin, group dynamics and motivation science, with management science.
This integration allowed us to identify challenges that decision teams face in times of crisis
and to derive a theory-based intervention: Collective implementation intentions or, simply
put, We-if-then planning. Our experimental evidence indicates that such plans causally
improve team decisions. In the tradition of action research, we hope to contribute to turning
scientific theory into practical wisdom. If we achieve this, responses in times of crisis will go
beyond “Oh My!” and make a positive difference in the real world.
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